We examine Euclidean distance preserving data perturbation as a tool for privacy-preserving data mining. Such perturbations allow many important data mining algorithms, with only minor modification, to be applied to the perturbed data and produce exactly the same results as if applied to the original data, e.g. hierarchical clustering and k-means clustering. However, the issue of how well the original data is hidden needs careful study. We take a step in this direction by assuming the role of an attacker armed with two types of prior information regarding the original data. We examine how well the attacker can recover the original data from the perturbed data and prior information. Our results offer insight into the vulnerabilities of Euclidean distance preserving transformations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent interest in the collection and monitoring of data using data mining technology for the purpose of security and business-related applications has raised serious concerns about privacy issues. For example, mining health-care data for security/fraud issues may require analyzing clinical records and pharmacy transaction data of many individuals over a certain area. However, releasing and gathering such diverse information belonging to different parties may violate privacy laws and eventually be a threat to civil liberties. Privacy-Preserving Data Mining (PPDM) strives to provide a solution to this dilemma. It aims to allow useful data patterns to be extracted without compromising privacy.
Data perturbation represents one common approach in PPDM. Here, the original private dataset X is perturbed and the resulting dataset Y is released for analysis. Perturbation approaches typically face a "privacy/accuracy" trade-off. On the one hand, perturbation must not allow the original data records to be adequately recovered. On the other, it must allow "patterns" in the original data to be recovered. In many cases, increased privacy comes at the cost of reduced accuracy and vice versa. For example, Agrawal and Srikant [1] proposed adding randomly generated i.i.d. noise to the dataset. They showed how the distribution from which the original data arose can be estimated using only the perturbed data and the distribution of the noise.
However, Kargupta et al. [2] and Huang et al. [3] pointed out how, in many cases, the noise can preserves the squared Euclidean distance between data tuples on expectation, but, the associated variance is large. 3 We defer the details of this analysis to future work and do not consider additive noise further in this paper.
Multiplicative perturbation: Two traditional multiplicative data perturbation schemes were studied in the statistics community [16] . One multiplies each data element by a random number that has a truncated Gaussian distribution with mean one and small variance. The other takes a logarithmic transformation of the data first, adds multivariate Gaussian noise, then takes the exponential function exp(.) of the noise-added data. These perturbations allow summary statistics (e.g., mean, variance) of the attributes to be estimated, but do not preserve Euclidean distances among records.
To assess the security of traditional multiplicative perturbation together with additive perturbation, Trottini et al. [17] proposed a Bayesian intruder model that considers both prior and posterior knowledge of the data. Their overall strategy of attacking the privacy of perturbed data using prior knowledge is the same as ours. However, they particularly focused on linkage privacy breaches, where an intruder tries to identify the identity (of a person) linked to a specific record; while we are primarily interested in data record recovery. Moreover, they did not consider
Euclidean distance preserving perturbation as we do.
Data anonymization: Samarati and Sweeney [5] , [18] developed the k-anonymity framework wherein the original data is perturbed so that the information for any individual cannot be distinguished from at least k-1 others. Values from the original data are generalized (replaced by a less specific value) to produce the anonymized data. This framework has drawn lots of attention because of its simple privacy definition. A variety of refinements have been proposed, see discussions on k-anonymity in various chapters in [19] . None of these approaches consider
Data micro-aggregation:
Two multivariate micro-aggregation approaches have been proposed by researchers in the data mining area. The technique presented by Aggarwal and Yu [20] partitions the original data into multiple groups of predefined size. For each group, a certain level of statistical information (e.g., mean and covariance) is maintained. This statistical information is used to create anonymized data that has similar statistical characteristics to the original dataset. 3 To our knowledge, such observations have not been made before.
Li et al. [21] proposed a kd-tree based perturbation method, which recursively partitions a dataset into subsets which are progressively more homogeneous after each partition. The private data in each subset is then perturbed using the subset average. The relationships between attributes are argued to be preserved reasonably well. Neither of these two approaches preserve Euclidean distance between the original data tuples.
Data swapping and shuffling: Data swapping perturbs the dataset by switching a subset of attributes between selected pairs of records so that the individual record entries are unmatched, but the statistics are maintained across the individual fields. A variety of refinements and applications of data swapping have been addressed since its initial appearance. We refer readers to [22] for a thorough treatment. Data shuffling [23] is similar to swapping, but is argued to improve upon many of the shortcomings of swapping for numeric data. However, neither swapping or shuffling preserves Euclidean distance which is the focus of this paper.
Some other data perturbation techniques:
Evfimievski et al. [24] , Rizvi and Haritza [25] considered the use of categorical data perturbation in the context of association rule mining.
Their algorithms delete real items and add bogus items to the original records. Association rules present in the original data can be estimated from the perturbed data. Along a related line, Verykios et al. [26] considered perturbation techniques which allow the discovery of some association rules while hiding others considered to be sensitive.
A. Most Related Work
In this part, we describe research most related to this paper. The majority of this focuses on Euclidean distance preserving data perturbation.
Oliveira and Zaiane [8] , [9] , Chen and Liu [7] discussed the use of geometric rotation for clustering and classification. These authors observed that the distance preserving nature of rotation makes it useful in PPDM, but did not analyze its privacy limitations, nor did they consider prior knowledge.
Chen et al. [12] also discussed a known input attack technique. Unlike ours, they considered a combination of distance preserving data perturbation followed by additive noise. And, they assumed a stronger form of known input prior knowledge: the attacker knows a subset of private data records and knows to which perturbed tuples they correspond. Finally, they assume that the number of linearly independent known input data records is no smaller than n (the dimensionality of the records). They pointed out that linear regression can be used to re-estimate private data tuples.
Mukherjee et al. [11] considered the use of discrete Fourier transformation (DFT) and discrete cosine transformation (DCT) to perturb the data. Only the high energy DFT/DCT coefficients are used, and the transformed data in the new domain approximately preserves Euclidean distance.
The DFT/DCT coefficients were further permuted to enhance the privacy protection level. Note that DFT and DCT are (complex) orthogonal transforms. Hence their perturbation technique can be expressed as left multiplication by a (complex) orthogonal matrix (corresponding to the DFT/DCT followed by a perturbation of the resulting coefficients), then a left multiplication by an identity matrix with some zeros on the diagonal (corresponding to dropping all but the high-energy coefficients). They did not consider attacks based on prior knowledge. As future work, it would be interesting to do so.
Turgay et al. [13] extended some of the results in our conference version of this work [10] .
They assume that the similarity matrix of the original data is made public rather than, Y , the perturbed data itself. They describe how an attacker, given at least n + 1 linearly independent original data tuples and their corresponding entries in the similarity matrix, can recover the private data. Like Chen et al., this differs from our known input attack in two main ways:
(i) we do not require prior knowledge beyond the known input tuples; (ii) our attack analysis smoothly encompasses the case where the number of linearly independent known input tuples is greater than n as well as less. Turgay et al. also describe how an attacker, given the underlying probability distribution of the original data, can use PCA to re-estimate the original data. This approach is based on ours in [10] , with the following differences. First, they assume that the global distribution of the private data is known, but we only assume a small sample drawn from the same distribution is known. Second, they use a simple (and clever) heuristic to find the best eigenvector mirror directions while we use a complete, enumerative search. While their approach has only linear computational complexity with respect to data dimensionality and our is exponential, their approach will not produce as good an eigenvector matching as ours. It is an interesting direction for future work to explore empirically and analytically how well the results of their heuristic search fare against the results of our complete, enumerative search.
Ting et al. [27] considered left-multiplication by a randomly generated orthogonal matrix.
However, they assume the original data tuples are rows rather than columns as we do. As a result, Euclidean distance between original data tuples is not preserved, but, sample mean and covariance are. If the original data arose as independent samples from multi-variate Gaussian distribution, then the perturbed data allows inferences to be drawn about this underlying distribution just as well as the original data. For all but small or very high-dimensional datasets, their approach is more resistant to prior knowledge attacks than Euclidean distance preserving perturbations.
Their perturbation matrix is m × m (m the number of original data tuples), much bigger than Euclidean distance preserving perturbation matrices, n × n (n the number of entries in each original data tuple).
Mukherjee et al. [28] considered additive noise to the most dominate principal components of the dataset along with a modification of k-nearest-neighbor classification on the perturbed data to improve accuracy. Moreover, they nicely extend to additive noise the ρ 1 -to-ρ 2 privacy breach measure originally introduced for categorical data in [24] . Their approach, however, does not preserve Euclidean distance, thus is fundamentally different than the perturbation techniques we consider.
Before we briefly describe another two attacks based on independent component analysis (ICA) [29] , it is necessary to give a brief ICA overview.
1) ICA Overview:
Given an n ′ -variate random vector V, one common ICA model posits that this random vector was generated by a linear combination of independent random variables,
i.e., V = AS with S an n-variate random vector with independent components. Typically, S is further assumed to satisfy the following additional assumptions: (i) at most one component is distributed as a Gaussian; (ii) n ′ ≥ n; and (iii) A has rank n.
One common scenario in practice: there is a set of unobserved samples (the columns of n × q matrix S) that arose from S which satisfies (i) -(iii) and whose components are independent.
But observed is n ′ × q matrix V whose columns arose as linear combination of the rows of S. The columns of V can be thought of as samples that arose from a random vector V which satisfies the above generative model. There are ICA algorithms whose goal is to recover S and A from V up to a row permutation and constant multiple. This ambiguity is inevitable due to the fact that for any diagonal matrix (with all non-zeros on the diagonal) D, and permutation matrix P , if A, S is a solution, then so is (ADP ), (P
2) ICA Based Attacks: Liu et al. [30] considered matrix multiplicative data perturbation,
where M is an n ′ × n matrix with each entry generated independently from the some distribution with mean zero and variance σ 2 . They discussed the application of the above ICA approach to estimate X directly from Y : S = X , V = Y, S = X, V = Y , and A = M. They argued the approach to be problematic because the ICA generative model imposes assumptions not likely to hold in many practical situations: the components of X are independent with at most one such being Gaussian distributed. Moreover, they pointed out that the row permutation and constant multiple ambiguity further hampers accurate recovery of X. A similar observation is made later by Chen et al. [12] .
Guo and Wu [31] considered matrix multiplicative perturbation assuming only that M is an n × n matrix (orthogonal or otherwise). They assumed the attacker has known input prior knowledge, i.e. she knows, X, a collection of original data columns from X. They develop an ICA-based attack technique for estimating the remaining columns in X. To avoid the ICA problems described in the previous paragraph, they instead applied ICA separately to X and Y producing representations (A e X , S e X ) and (A Y , S Y ). They argued that these representations are related in a natural way allowing X to be estimated. Their approach is similar in spirit to our known sample attack which related S and Y through representations derived through eigen-analysis.
III. EUCLIDEAN DISTANCE PRESERVING PERTURBATION AND PRIVACY BREACHES
In this section, the definition of T , a Euclidean distance preserving data perturbation is provided, as well as the definition of a privacy breach.
A. Notation and Conventions
Throughout this paper, unless otherwise stated, the following notations and conventions are used. "Euclidean distance preserving" and "distance preserving" are used interchangeably. All matrices and vectors discussed are assumed to have real entries (unless otherwise stated). All vectors are assumed to be column vectors and M ′ denotes the transpose of any matrix M. Given a vector x, ||x|| denotes its Euclidean norm. An m × n matrix M is said to be orthogonal if M ′ M = I n , the n × n identity matrix. 4 The set of all n × n, orthogonal matrices is denoted by
Given n × p and n × q matrices A and B, let [A|B] denote the n × (p + q) matrix whose first p columns are A and last q are B. Likewise, given p × n and q × n matrices A and B, let   A B   denote the (p + q) × n matrix whose first p rows are A and last q are B.
The data owner's private dataset is represented as an n × m matrix X, with each column a record and each row an attribute (each record is assumed to be non-zero). The data owner applies a Euclidean distance preserving perturbation to X to produce an n × m data matrix Y , which is then released to the public or another party for analysis. That Y was produced from X by a Euclidean distance preserving data perturbation (but not which one) is also make public.
B. Euclidean Distance Preserving Perturbation
Here H is also called a rigid motion. It has been shown that any distance preserving function is equivalent to an orthogonal transformation followed by a translation [32, pg. 128]. In other words, H may be specified by a pair (M, v) ∈ O n × ℜ n , in that, for all x ∈ ℜ n , H(x) = Mx + v. If v = 0, H preserve Euclidean length: ||x|| = ||H(x)||, as such, it moves x along the surface of the hyper-sphere with radius ||x|| and centered at the origin.
We do not assume that the correspondence between the columns of the perturbed dataset
. ., y m ) and the columns of the private dataset X (denoted x 1 , . . ., x m ) is known; i.e. the perturbed version of x i is not necessarily y i . Instead, the columns of X are transformed using a Euclidean distance preserving function, then are permuted to produce the columns of the perturbed dataset Y . Formally, the perturbed dataset Y , is produced as follows.
The private data owner chooses (M T , v T ), a secret Euclidean distance preserving function, and π, a secret permutation of {1, . . . , m}. Then, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, the data owner produces y π(i) =
Euclidean distance between the private data tuples is preserved in the perturbed dataset: for 
C. Privacy Breaches
Based on the assumptions described earlier, the attacker will employ a stochastic attack technique 5 and produce 1 ≤ j ≤ m and non-zero,x ∈ ℜ n . Here,x is an estimate of xĵ (withĵ denoting π −1 (j)), the private data tuple that was perturbed to produce y j . 6 Given ǫ > 0, we consider three different privacy breach definitions. 2) An ǫ-MED-privacy breach (Minimum Entry Difference) occurs if min n i=1 {NAD(xĵ ,i ,x i )} ≤ ǫ where xĵ ,i andx i are the i th entries and NAD(a,â) is the normalized absolute difference:
equalsâ if a = 0, otherwise, equals |a −â|/|a|.
3) An ǫ-cos-privacy breach occurs if 1 − cos(xĵ,x) ≤ ǫ where cos(w,ŵ) denotes the cosine
The relative Euclidean distance breach definition is inappropriate in situations where the accurate recovery of even one entry of a private data tuple is unacceptable to the data owner.
The MED breach definition is intended for this situation. Moreover, the relative Euclidean distance breach definition is inappropriate for very high dimensional data (due to the curse of dimensionality) or where accuracy recovery of a private data tuple up to a scaling factor is unacceptable to the data owner. The cos breach definition is intended for these situations.
In the next two sections, we describe and analyze an attack technique for each type of prior knowledge listed in Section I. The main focus of analysis concerns, ρ(ǫ), the probability that an ǫ-privacy breach occurred. However, we briefly discuss how the analysis can be applied to the probability that an ǫ-MED-privacy breach and ǫ-cos-privacy breach occurred.
IV. KNOWN INPUT ATTACK
For 1 ≤ a ≤ m − 1, let X a denote the first a columns of X. The attacker is assumed to know X a and her attack proceeds in two steps.
(1) Infer as many as possible of the input-output 5 Note that X and Y are fixed. 6 The attacker does not need to knowĵ; she is merely producing an estimate of the private data tuple that was perturbed to produce yj. 7 Note, 0 ≤ cos(w,ŵ) ≤ 1, equaling 1 if and only if w andŵ differ only by a scaling factor.
mappings in π a (the restriction of π to {1, . . . , a}). 8 (2) Using known inputs along with their inferred outputs, producex.
The bulk of our work involves the development and analysis of an attack technique in the case where the data perturbation is assumed to be orthogonal (does not involve a fixed translation,
. The majority of this section is dedicated to developing and analyzing an attack in this case. Then, in Appendix I, we briefly describe how the attack and analysis can be extended to arbitrary Euclidean distance preserving perturbation (v T = 0).
A. Inferring π a
The attacker may not have enough information to infer π a , so, her goal is to infer π I (the restriction of π to I ⊆ {1, . . . , a}), for as large an I as possible. Next, we describe how the goal can be precisely stated as an algorithmic problem that the attacker can address given her available information.
Given I ⊆ {1, . . . , a}, an assignment on I is a 1-1 function α : I → {1, . . . , m}. An assignment α on I is valid if it satisfies both of the following conditions for all i, j ∈ I, (1) ||x i || = ||y α(i) || and (2) ||x i − x j || = ||y α(i) − y α(j) ||. There is at least one valid assignment on I, namely π I , but, there may be more. I is uniquely valid if π I is the only valid assignment on I. Given uniquely valid I ⊆ {1, . . . , a}, I is said to be maximal if there does not exist uniquely valid J ⊆ {1, . . . , a} such that |J| > |I|. It can be shown that there exists only one maximal uniquely valid subset of {1, . . . , a}. Thus, the attacker's goal is to find the maximal uniquely valid subset of {1, . . . , a} along with its corresponding assignment.
The following straight-forward algorithm will meet the attackers goal by employing a topdown, level-wise search of the subset space of {1, . . . , a}. The inner for-loop uses an implicit linear ordering to enumerate the size ℓ subsets without repeats and requiring O(1) space. Now we develop an algorithm that, given I ⊆ {1, . . . , a}, determines if I is uniquely valid, and, if so, also computes the corresponding assignment. The idea is search the space of all assignments on I for valid ones. Once more than one valid assignment is identified, the search is cut-off and the algorithm outputs that I is not uniquely valid. Otherwise, exactly one valid assignment, π I , will be found. In this case, the algorithm outputs that I is uniquely valid and returns the corresponding assignment. The algorithm performs a depth-first search employing a simple, but effective, pruning rule to eliminate possible assignment choices at each node in the search tree. The rationale for this pruning rule is described next.
) which satisfies both of the following conditions: (1) ||xˆi|| = ||y j ||,
can be thought of as the set of all valid candidate assignments forî as an extension of valid assignment α 1 . This provides pruning in the search through the assignment space over I as validated by the following theorem (whose proof is straight-forward).
Theorem 4.1:
Given I 1 ⊆ I andî ∈ (I \ I 1 ), let α 1 andα 1 be valid assignments on I 1 and (I 1 ∪ {î}), respectively. Further assume thatα 1 extends α 1 in the following sense: for all ℓ ∈
Each node in the depth first search tree represents a valid assignment α 1 over some subset, I 1 , of I. The next step in the search extends the assignment by choosingî ∈ (I \ I 1 ) and choosing an assignment forî from C(I 1 ,î).
Algorithm IV-A.2 Determining Unique Validity Main
Inputs: I ⊆ {1, . . . , a}.
1: Set global variable N umV alidAssignF ound = 0.
2: Call Algorithm IV-A.3 on inputs ∅ and α ∅ (α ∅ denotes the unique valid assignment on ∅).
3: If N umV alidAssignF ound > 1, then return "I IS NOT UNIQUELY VALID". Else, return "I IS UNIQUELY VALID WITH ASSIGNMENT" αI .
Comment:
The order by which the elements of (I \ I 1 ) and C(I 1 ,î) are chosen in iterating through the for loops in Algorithm IV-A.3 does not affect the correctness of the algorithm.
However, it may affect efficiency. For simplicity, the loops order the elements in these sets from smallest to largest index number.
Algorithm IV-A.3 Determining Unique Validity Recursive
Inputs: I1 ⊆ I and α1 a valid assignment on I1.
1: If I1 = I, then 2: N umV alidAssignF ound + +
3:
If N umV alidAssignF ound == 1, then set αI to α1.
4:
End If.
5: Else, do 6: Forî ∈ (I \ I1) and as long as N umV alidAssignF ound ≤ 1, do
7:
For j ∈ C(I1,î) and as long as N umV alidAssignF ound ≤ 1, do 8: Extend α1 toα1 s.t.α1(î) = j. LetÎ1 = I1 ∪î.
9:
Call algorithm IV-A.3 on inputsÎ1 andα1.
Algorithm IV-A.1 has worst-case computational complexity O(m a ). While this is no better than a simple brute-force approach, in our experiments, quite reasonable running times are observed because, few original data tuples will have the same length and/or few pairs of original data tuples will have the same Euclidean distance.
B. Known Input-Output Attack
Assume, without loss of generality, that the attacker applies Algorithm IV-A.1 and learns π q (0 ≤ q ≤ a), i.e. {1, . . . , q} is the maximal uniquely valid subset of {1, . . . , a}. Further, to simply notation, we may also assume that π q (i) = i. 9 Let Y q denote the first q columns of Y . As such, the attacker is assumed to know X q and the fact that Y q = M T X q where M T is an unknown orthogonal matrix. Based on this, she will apply an attack, called the known input-output attack, to produce q < j ≤ m, andx, which is an estimate of xĵ, the private tuple that was perturbed to produce y j .
10
The attack is performed in two steps: 1) Using X q and Y q , the attacker will produceM , an estimation of M T ; 2) Then, for any q < j ≤ m, the attacker can produce estimatê
Let ρ(xĵ, ǫ) denote P r(||x − xĵ|| ≤ ||xĵ||ǫ), the probability that an ǫ-privacy breach will result from the attacker estimating xĵ asx. We will develop a closed-form expression for ρ(xĵ, ǫ).
9 This can be achieved by the attacker appropriately reordering the columns of Xa and Y . 10 IfM
where xĵ was the private tuple perturbed to produce yj.
This expression will only involve information known to the attacker, therefore, she can choose q < j ≤ m so as to maximize ρ(xĵ, ǫ).
which is the set of all M ∈ O n such that MX q = Y q . However, since the attacker has no additional information for further narrowing down this space of the possibilities, she will assume each is equally likely to be M T . She will chooseM uniformly from M(X q , Y q ). 11 In most cases, M(X q , Y q ) is uncountable. As such, it is not obvious how to chooseM uniformly from M(X q , Y q ) and also not obvious how to compute ρ(xĵ, ǫ) = P r(||x−xĵ|| ≤ ||xĵ||ǫ). These issues will be discussed in Section IV-D. Before doing so, we discuss some important linear algebra background.
C. Linear Algebra background
Let Col(X q ) denote the column space of X q and Col ⊥ (X q ) denote its orthogonal complement,
and Col ⊥ (Y q ) denote its orthogonal compliment. Let k denote the dimension of Col(X q ). The "Fundamental Theorem of Linear Algebra" [33, pg. 95] implies that the dimension of
Let U k and V k denote n × k matrices whose columns form an orthonormal basis for Col(X q )
and Col(Y q ), respectively. It can easily be shown that
U n−k and V n−k denote n × (n − k) matrices whose columns form an orthonormal basis for
D. A Closed-Form Expression for ρ(xĵ, ǫ)
Now we return to the issue of how to chooseM uniformly from M(X q , Y q ) and how to
To chooseM uniformly from M(X q , Y q ), the basic idea is to utilize standard algorithms for choosing a matrix P uniformly from O n−k , then apply an appropriately designed transformation to P . The transformation will be an affine, bijection from O n−k to M(X q , Y q ). 12 The following technical result, proven in Appendix I, provides this transformation.
Inputs: U k , an n × k matrix whose columns form an orthonormal basis of Col(Xq), and MT U k (MT is unknown); U n−k and V n−k , n × (n − k) matrices whose columns form an orthonormal basis of Col ⊥ (Xq) and Col ⊥ (Yq), respectively.
Outputs:M a uniformly chosen matrix from M(Xq, Yq).
1: Choose P uniformly from O n−k using algorithm [34] .
Some special cases are interesting to highlight:
M is one of two choices (one of which equals M T ); otherwise,M is, in theory, chosen from an uncountable set (containing M T ).
Now we develop a closed-form expression for ρ(xĵ, ǫ). The key points are outlined, while a more rigorous justification is provided in Appendix I. First of all, from Algorithm IV-D.1,M
it can left-multiply each term in the left || . . . || of the second probability without changing the equality. As a result, the derivation continues
12 That the resultingM was chosen uniformly from M(Xq, Yq) could be more rigorously justified using left-invariance of probability measures and the Haar probability measure over O n−k . But, such a discussion is not relevant to this paper and is omitted. 13 We define O0 to contain a single, empty matrix. And, for P ∈ O0, we define V n−k P U ′ n−k to be the n × n zero matrix.
14 Using (i), the derivation continues
where the second equality is due to the fact that B ′ ∈ O n−k , and thus (P ′ B ′ ) can be regarded as having been uniformly chosen from O n−k just like P ′ (a rigorous proof of the second equality is provided in Appendix I). Putting the whole derivation together,
Let S n−k (||U ′ n−k xĵ||) denote the hyper-sphere in ℜ n−k with radius ||U ′ n−k xĵ|| and centered at the origin. Since P is chosen uniformly from O n−k , then any point on the surface of
where SA(.) denotes the surface area of a subset of a hyper-sphere. 15 Based on equations (5), we prove, in Appendix I, the following closed form expression, for ρ(xĵ, ǫ), where, Γ(.) denotes the standard gamma function,
as 0.5 if S1(U ′ 1 xĵ , ||xĵ||ǫ) is one point, and as 1
otherwise. Moreover, we define
Comment: it can be shown that ||U ′ n−k xĵ|| is the distance from xĵ to its closest point in Col(X q ). Thus, the sensitivity of a tuple to breach is dependent upon its length relative to its distance to the column space of X q .
Recall that the attacker seeks to use the closed-form expressions for ρ(xĵ, ǫ) to decide for which q < j ≤ m doesx =M ′ y j produce the best estimation of xĵ. This is naturally done by choosing j to maximize ρ(xĵ, ǫ). To allow for this, observe that ||xĵ||ǫ and ||U ′ n−k xĵ|| equal 16 ||y j ||ǫ and ||V ′ n−k y j ||, respectively, which are known to the attacker. Therefore, (6) can be rewritten as follows, where ac []−1 (y) denotes arccos
To spell out the attack algorithm, first note that U k , U n−k , V k , and V n−k can be computed from X q and Y q using standard procedures [33] . Second,
matrix that can be computed 17 from U k and X q . Third, a recursive procedure for computing (7) is described in Appendix I. The precise details of the attack technique can be seen in Algorithm IV-D.2. The ǫ-privacy breach probability ρ(ǫ) equals max q<j≤m ρ(xĵ, ǫ).
Algorithm IV-D.2 Known Input Attack Algorithm
Inputs: Y , ǫ ≥ 0, and Xq. The attacker knows Yq = MT Xq (MT is unknown).
Outputs: q < j ≤ m andx ∈ ℜ n the corresponding estimate of xĵ.
, and MT U k as described earlier.
2: For each q < j ≤ m do
3:
Compute ρ(xĵ, ǫ) using (7) as described in Appendix I.
4: End For.
5: Choose the j from the previous loop producing the largest ρ(xĵ, ǫ).
6: ChooseM uniformly from M(Xq, Yq) by applying Algorithm IV-D.1.
E. Experiments
The experiments are designed to assess the computational efficiency of the overall known input attack and its effectiveness at breaching privacy. We used two datasets as the input X, respectively: 1) a 100,000 tuple synthetic dataset generated from a 100-variate Gaussian distribution 18 ; 2) the Letter Recognition dataset, 20,000 tuples and 16 numeric attributes, from UCI machine learning repository -we removed tuples which were duplicated over the numeric attributes yielding a final dataset of 18,668 tuples. The attacks were implemented in Matlab 7
(R14) and all experiments were carried out on a Thinkpad laptop with 1.83GHz Intel Core 2 CPU, 1.99GB RAM, and WindowsXP system.
The first experiment fixes X and its perturbed version Y , but changes the number of known input tuples, a. It proceeds by carrying out ten iterations as follows. Select a linearly independent tuples randomly from X (these become the know inputs). Use Algorithm IV-A.1 to compute 17 Since Col(U k ) = Col(Xq), then by solving k systems of linear equations (one for each column of U k ), a q × k matrix A can be computed such that XqA = U k . 18 The mean vector is specified by independently generating 100 numbers from a univariate Guassian with mean zero and variance one. The covariance matrix is specified by (i) independently generating 100 data tuples each with 100 independently generated entries a from a univariate Guassian with mean zero and variance one, (ii) computing the empirical covariance of this 100 tuple dataset.
I, the maximal uniquely valid assignment. Use steps 2-5 in Algorithm IV-D.2 to compute the ρ(ǫ), the ǫ-privacy breach probability (a closed-form was given immediately above Algorithm
IV-D.2).
To measure the accuracy of the attack, we report the average of ρ(ǫ) and |I| over all iterations.
To measure the efficiency, we report the average time taken to compute I (the rest is ignored as the overall attack computation time is dominated by Algorithm IV-A.1). In Figures 1 and 2 , results are shown with ǫ = 0.15. In Figure 3 , accuracy results are shown with varying ǫ and a fixed at four. In all Figures, the error bars show one standard deviation above and below the average. Then the attack proceeds by carrying out the following operations ten times. Select a = 50 linearly independent tuples randomly from X and use Algorithm IV-A.1 to compute the maximal uniquely valid assignment I. The average time taken to compute I is given in Figure 4 left. For the Letter Recognition data, k takes a value in {2000, 4000, . . . , 18000} and the attack randomly select a = 10 linearly independent tuples as the known inputs. The average time taken to find I is given in Figure 4 right.
Regarding the known input attack accuracy, the linking phase of the attack (Algorithm IV-A.1), exhibits excellent performance. For synthetic data, its performance is perfect in that all known input tuples have their corresponding perturbed tuple inferred (see Figure 1 left) . For real data, its performance is nearly perfect -see Figure 2 left. As expected, ρ(ǫ) approaches one as a increases see Figures 1 and 2 right. Interestingly on the synthetic dataset, the transition from ρ(ǫ) = 0 → 1 occurs very sharply around a = 60. Moreover, on the real dataset, ρ(ǫ) = 1 with a as small as 4 (and we also observe in Figure 3 that the probability remains fairly high for ǫ as small as 0.07).
Regarding computational efficiency, the algorithm appears to require quite reasonable time in all cases observed, e.g. less that 450 seconds on the synthetic dataset with 100 known tuples (see Figure 1 center) and less than 45 seconds on the real dataset with 16 known inputs (see Figure 4 left and right) . These results demonstrate that, despite the high worst-case computational complexity, the computation times on both real and synthetic data are quite reasonable.
The experimental results support the conclusion that the attack can breach privacy in plausible situations. For example, on the 16-dimensional, 18688 tuple real dataset, the known input attack achieves a privacy breach with probability one using four known inputs and less than 30 seconds of run-time.
F. Analysis Over MED and Cos Privacy Breach Definitions
Hence, if an ǫ-privacy breach occurs, then so does an ǫ-MED-privacy breach. Therefore, the analysis of the known input attack can be used to lower-bound the probability that an ǫ-MEDprivacy breach occurred. As a result, our experiments show that on the Letter Recognition data, four known inputs produce an ǫ-MED-privacy breach with probability one. Unfortunately, the lower-bound is not tight as examples can be found making the relative Euclidean distance arbitrarily larger than the minimum MED distance.
ǫ-cos-privacy breach: It is shown in Appendix I that 1 − cos(x, xĵ) = ||x−xĵ|| 2 2||xĵ|| 2 . Therefore, an ǫ-cos-privacy breach occurred if and only if an ( √ 2ǫ)-privacy breach occurred. Therefore, the analysis of the known input attack can be easily modified to produce a closed-form expression for the probability that an ǫ-cos-privacy breach occurred.
V. KNOWN SAMPLE ATTACK
In this scenario, we assume that each data column of X arose as an independent sample from a random vector V with unknown p.d.f. We also make the following mild technical assumption:
the covariance matrix Σ V of V has all distinct eigenvalues. Furthermore, we assume that the attacker has a collection of q samples that arose independently from V -these are denoted as the columns of matrix S. It is important to stress that the columns of S are not assumed to be samples from the private data X, rather, they are samples drawn from V independently of X.
Using these assumptions, we will design a Principal Component Analysis (PCA)-based attack technique and analyze its privacy breach probability through experiments.
Attack Intuition: The basic procedure is to estimate M T and use this estimate to undo the data perturbation applied to X. The key idea in estimating M T is that the principle components of 19 Σ (M T V+v T ) equal the perturbation by M T of the principal components of Σ V up to a mirror flip about each component. Since these covariance matrices can be estimated from Y and S, respectively, then so can the corresponding principal components. The equality above then allows M T to be estimated up to mirror flips. To choose the right mirror flip, an equality of distributions test is applied using S and Y .
A. PCA Preliminaries and a Key Property
Because Σ V is an n×n, symmetric matrix with all distinct eigenvalues, it has n real eigenvalues 
Because all the eigenspaces of Σ V have dimension one, it can be shown that each normalized eigenspace, Z(V) i , contains only two vectors and these differ only by a factor of −1. Thus, letting z i denote the lexicographically larger vector, Z(V) i , can be written as {z i , −z i }. Let Z denote the n × n eigenvector matrix whose i th column is z i . Because the eigenspaces of Σ V are pairwise orthogonal and ||z i || = 1, Z is orthogonal. Similarly, Z(M T V + v T ) i can be written as {w i , −w i } (w i is the lexicographically larger among w i , −w i ) and W is the eigenvector matrix with i th column w i (W is orthogonal). Note again that columns in both Z and W are ordered such that the i th eigenvector is associated with the i th eigenvalue. The following result, proven in Appendix I, forms the basis of the attack algorithm.
Corollary 5.2:
Let I n be the space of all n × n, matrices with each diagonal entry ±1 and each off-diagonal entry 0 (2 n matrices in total). There exists D 0 ∈ I n such that
B. Known Sample Attack (PCA Attack) Algorithm on Orthogonal Data Perturbation
Like Section IV, we first develop the attack technique in the case where the data perturbation is assumed to be orthogonal (does not involve a fixed translation, v T = 0). Then, in Section V-E, we discuss how the attack technique can be extended to arbitrary Euclidean distance preserving perturbation (v T = 0). 
Since the two-sample test requires O((m+q)
2 ) computation for p(., .), the overall computation
Take note that the quality of covariance matrix estimation from S and Y impacts the effectiveness of the attack. Clearly, poor quality estimation will result in low attack accuracy.
Algorithm V-B.1 PCA-based Attack Algorithm on Orthogonal Data Perturbation
Inputs: S, an n × q matrix where each column arose as an independent sample from V -a random vector with unknown p.d.f.
whose covariance matrix has all distinct eigenvalues; and such that the columns of X arose as independent samples from V. Y where MT is an unknown, n × n, orthogonal matrix.
Outputs: 1 ≤ j ≤ m andx ∈ ℜ n the corresponding estimate of xĵ.
1: Compute sample covariance matrixΣS from S and sample covariance matrixΣY from Y . With the exception of sample size, we do not consider other sampling factors (departures from independence, noise, outliers, etc.) that effect the quality of covariance matrix estimation. We feel such issues are orthogonal to this work as any technique for covariance matrix estimation can be used in the attack. For simplicity, we stick with the standard, sample covariance matrices.
C. Experiments -Orthogonal Data Perturbation
We conduct experiments on both synthetic and real world data to evaluate the performance of PCA-based attack on orthogonal data perturbation. We choose the perturbation matrix uniformly from O n and keep it fixed for the same private data. Since the choice of π does not affect the experiments, we choose the identity permutation throughout. To approximate the probability of privacy breach, we compute a fraction of the breach out of 100 independent runs. In all figures demonstrated in this section, a solid line is added showing a best polynomial fit to the points.
This line is generated with Matlab's curve fitting toolbox. The attack was implemented in Matlab 6 (R13) and all experiments were carried out on a Dell dual-processor workstation with 3.00GHz and 2.99GHz, Xeon CPUs, 3.00GB RAM, and WindowsXP system.
The synthetic dataset contains 10, 000 data points, and it is generated from a multi-variate sample generated independently from the same distribution. We conduct experiments to examine how sample size affects the quality of the attack. Figure 5 shows that when the relative error bound is fixed, the probability of privacy breach increases as the sample size increases.
For the real world data, we choose the Letter Recognition Database and Adult Database from the UCI machine learning repository. 20 The Letter Recognition data has 20, 000 tuples and 16 numeric features. We choose the first 6 attributes (excluding the class label) for the experiments.
Note that unlike the experiments in Section IV-E, here we do not remove duplicates. The Adult data contains 32, 561 tuples, and it is extracted from the census bureau database. We select three numeric attributes: age, education-num and hours-per-week, for the experiments. We randomly separate each dataset into two disjoint sets. One set is viewed as the original data, and the other one is the attacker's sample data. To examine the influence of sample size, we perform the same series of experiments as we do for Gaussian data. Figure 6 gives the results for Letter Recognition data. Figure 7 gives the results for Adult data.
From the above experiments, we have the following observations: (1) the larger the sample size, the better the quality of data recovery and (2) among these three datasets, the PCA-based attack works best for Gaussian data, next Letter Recognition data, and then Adult data. The first observation require no explanations. We will discuss the second one in the next section. Consider the minimum ratio of any pair of eigenvalues, i.e., min{λ i /λ j : ∀i = j; i, j = 1, . . . , n} (we call this the minimum eigen-ratio). We would expect that, the smaller this value, the smaller the attacker's success probability. To examine this hypothesis, we generate a three- The original data contains 10, 000 tuples. We fix the sample ratio to be 2% and relative error bound ǫ = 0.05. Figure 8 shows that when all other parameters are fixed, the higher the eigen-ratio, the better the performance of the attack algorithm. This actually explains why, in our previous experiments, PCA attack works best for Gaussian data, then Letter
D. Effectiveness of the Known
Recognition data, and then Adult data. A simple computation shows that the minimum eigenratios of the Gaussian data, Letter Recognition data and Adult data are 19.6003, 1.3109, 1.2734, respectively.
Second, suppose f is invariant over some
, and the attack algorithm will fail. We would expect that the closer f is to invariance, the smaller the attacker's success probability. To examine this hypothesis we need a metric for quantifying the degree to which f is invariant. Intuitively, the invariance of f can be quantified as the degree to which f D i and f D 0 are distinguishable (minimized over all This measurement is symmetric and nonnegative, and when it is equal to zero, the distributions can be regarded as indistinguishable. So, we quantify invariance as
Clearly Inv(f ) ≥ 0 with equality exactly when f is invariant. The behavior of Inv in the general case is quite complicated. However, under certain (fairly strong) assumptions, Inv(f )
can be nicely characterized. In Appendix I we provide derivation details of the following result.
Let µ be some fixed element of ℜ n . Assume that f is an n-variate Gaussian distribution with mean vector µ V = αµ for some α ≥ 0 and invertible covariance matrix Σ V . We have,
where Λ V and Z are the eigenvalue and eigenvector matrices of Σ V , respectively. Hence, we see that Inv(f ) approaches zero quadratically as α → 0.
With this result we can carry out experiments to measure the effect of the degree to which f is invariant on the attacker's success probability. We generate a dataset by sampling each tuple 1, 1) ′ . Note that the minimum eigen-ratio is 20, sufficiently large to isolate the effect of decreasing invariance on attacker's success probability. We change the value of α from 0 to 10. The original dataset contains 10, 000 tuples. We fix the sample ratio to be 2%, and relative error bound ǫ = 0.05. Figure 9 shows that as the mean approaches zero, the probability of privacy breach drops to zero too; however, as the mean runs away from zero, the probability of privacy breach increases very fast.
E. Known Sample Attack (PCA Attack) Algorithm on General Distance-Preserving Data Perturbation
In the previous subsections, we had considered the case where the data perturbation is assumed to be orthogonal (does not involve a fixed translation, v T = 0). Now we consider how the attack technique can be extended to arbitrary Euclidean distance preserving perturbation (v T = 0). The basic idea is very similar to that regarding the known input attack described in Appendix I. Since the same v T is added to all tuples in the perturbation of X, then by considering differences, we can transform the situation back to the orthogonal data perturbation case and apply the same attack technique described above. However, since the PCA attack assumes that the tuples in X arose independently from V, then the difference tuples over Y cannot be computed with respect to a single fixed tuple (the resulting tuples could not be regarded as having arisen independently).
Instead, disjoint pairs of tuples from Y must be used. Further since the tuples in S are also assumed to have arisen independently from V, then difference tuples must also be formed from S using disjoint pairs.
Let s 1 , . . ., s q denote the sample tuples (columns of S). We assume that q and m (the number of tuples in Y ) are even; if not, we simply discard a randomly chosen tuple from Y or S or both. Let S * denote the n×(q/2) matrix whose i th column is s * 
The intuitive rationale for (10)
follows thatx ≈ xĵ.
F. Effectiveness of the Known Sample Attack (PCA Attack) Algorithm on General DistancePreserving Data Perturbation
Similar to the discussion in Section V-D, we focus on the p.d.f., f * , of V − W, and more specifically, (1) the difference in the eigenvalues of Σ (V−W) expressed as the minimum eigenratio, and (2) the invariance of f * , Inv(f * ). It can easily be shown that the minimum eigen-ratio of Σ (V−W) is the same as that of Σ V . Regarding the invariance of f * , if f is multi-variate Gaussian, then the discussion in Section V-D implies that Inv(f * ) = 0 because the mean of f * is 0. Hence, the PCA attack algorithm will likely fail in the case where the original data arose from a multi-variate Gaussian distribution and the data perturbation is distance-preserving but not orthogonal (i.e. v T = 0).
G. Experiments -General Distance-Preserving Data Perturbation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the PCA attack on general distance-preserving data perturbation. We produce the translation vector with Matlab's random number generator.
Once generated, the translation is fixed for the same private data for all the experiments. The translation vector is set sufficiently large to distinguish general distance-preserving perturbation from orthogonal transformation.
We first experiment with the same Gaussian data (with a non-zero mean and a high minimum eigen-ratio) we used in Section V-C. As expected, the attack achieves very low frequency of privacy breach regardless of the sample ratio (see Figure 10) . Next, we generate data from minimum eigen-ratio thereby reducing the effect of this factor in the experiment. The results are depicted in Figure 11 . Here we see that the attack works significantly better. We believe this is due to the asymmetry of the Gaussian mixture allows problems with invariance to be better avoided.
We also conducted experiments with the Adult real dataset and found the frequency of privacy breach to degrade by approximately 10% as compared to the Adult dataset with only an orthogonal perturbation as discussed in Section V-C. We believe this is due to the fact that the underlying generation mechanism for the three attributes of the Adult dataset that we consider is sufficiently close to a multivariate Gaussian to cause attack problems due to invariance. This claim is based on observing a visualization of the dataset.
H. Analysis Over MED and Cos Privacy Breach Definitions
In the case of orthogonal data perturbation or the case of arbitrary Euclidean distance preserving perturbation, the PCA-based attack does not depend upon the definition of privacy breach.
Of course, the empirical analysis does depend upon the privacy breach definition. For brevity, we leave to future work the empirical analysis of the known sample attack with respect to other ǫ-MED-privacy-breach or ǫ-cos-privacy-breach.
VI. DISCUSSION: VULNERABILITIES AND A POSSIBLE REMEDY
When considering known input prior knowledge, dimensionality significantly affects the vulnerability of the data to breach. The larger the difference between the number of linearly independent known inputs and the dimensionality, the lower the vulnerability of the data to breach.
When considering known sample prior knowledge, our results point out three factors which affect the vulnerability of the data to breach. 1) Dimensionality: our approach has time complexity exponential in the number of data attributes. Hence, breaching medium to high dimensional data is infeasible. We conclude the paper by pointing out a potential remedy to the privacy problems described earlier for the known sample attack. The data owner generatesR, a ℓ × n matrix with each entry sampled independently from a distribution with mean zero and variance one and releases Y = RX where R = ℓ −1/2R (this type of data perturbation for ℓ ≤ n was discussed in [30] ). It can be shown that matrix R is orthogonal on expectation and the probability of orthogonality approaches one exponentially fast with ℓ. By increasing ℓ, the data owner can guarantee that distances are preserved with arbitrarily high probability. Moreover, it can be shown that the randomness introduced by R kills the covariance in Y used by the known sample attack. Specifically, given random vector V, it can be shown that, Σ RV (the covariance matrix of RV) equals I n γ for some constant γ. Therefore, the separation between the eigenvalues is zero, so, as mentioned above, the known sample attack fails.
With respect to the known input attack, the RX perturbation is potentially vulnerable. We have begun investigating a maximum-likelihood attack technique (see [19] for a summary). Further investigation of RX perturbation is left to future work. 
Proof: First we derive an expression for Σ V in terms of Σ (M T V+v T ) .
Now consider any non-zero λ ∈ ℜ n , and observe that det(
. Therefore λ is an eigenvalue of Σ V if and only if λ is an eigenvalue of Σ (M T V+v T ) . Finally, consider any non-zero w ∈ ℜ n . We have that
Corollary 5.2: Let I n be the space of all n × n, matrices with each diagonal entry ±1 and each off-diagonal entry 0 (2 n matrices in total). There exists
Proof: Theorem 5.1 implies that for all
= D 0 and Z is orthogonal the desired result follows.
Now we provide the derivation details of (9) under the assumption that f is an n variate Gaussian distribution with mean vector µ V = αµ for some α ≥ 0 and invertible covariance matrix Σ V .
First of all, for n-variate Gaussian distributions g and h with the same covariance matrix Σ (assumed to be invertible) and mean vectors µ g and µ h , we have
Second of all, for any D in I n : (1) (8) and (11) imply
B. Known Input Attack: Proof of Theorem 4.2 and MED/COS Privacy Breach Derivations
To prove this theorem we rely upon the following key technical result. [33, pg. 201 ] implies that k = rank(U k A) ≤ min{k, rank(A)}, thus, rank(A) = k. Therefore, from [33, pg. 90 ], A has a right inverse.
For any M ∈ O n , we have
The last ⇔ follows from the fact that A has a right inverse. We conclude that M(X q , Y q ) = M(U k , M T U k ). Now we complete the proof by showing that M(U k , M T U k ) = P.
(1) For any M ∈ P, there exists
where the first zero in the second equality is due to the fact that
Thus, there exists (n − k) × (n − k) matrix P with V n−k P = MU n−k . Observe that
Thus,
Now we prove Theorem 4.2.
Proof: Clearly L is an affine map. Moreover, Lemma 1.1 directly implies that L maps
To see that L is one-to-one, consider
Now we provide the details of the results crucial to establishing the connections between an ǫ-privacy-breach and an ǫ-MED-privacy-breach or ǫ-cos-privacy-breach. First we show that:
From (1) and the discussion immediately above it, we havex =M ′ y j =M ′ M T xĵ, and thus, ||x|| = ||xĵ||. It follows that
Now we show that: min
Without loss of generality, assume that ∀1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, xĵ ,i = 0 and ∀ℓ + 1 ≤ i ≤ n, xĵ ,i = 0. We have:
C. Known Input Attack: A Rigorous Development of the Closed-Form Expression for ρ(xĵ, ǫ)
Up to (2), we had derived the following result (for P chosen uniformly from O n−k ):
where B ∈ O n−k and satisfies M T U n−k B = V n−k . Now we provide a rigorous proof of (3), i.e. the r.h.s. above equals P r(||P
To do so, we need some material from measure theory.
Because O n−k is a locally compact topological group [32, pg. 293] , it has a Haar probability measure, denoted by µ, over B, the Borel algebra on O n−k . This is commonly regarded as the standard uniform probability measure over O n−k . Its key property is left-invariance: for all B ∈ B and all M ∈ O n−k , µ(B) = µ(MB), i.e., shifting B by a rigid motion does not change its probability assignment.
22 By definition of µ we have,
and,
n−k xĵ, ||xĵ||ǫ) are topologically closed sets, then they are Borel subsets of O n−k , therefore, µ is defined on each of these.
where the second equality is due to the left-invariance of µ and the third equality is due to the fact that BO
. Since the last equality above was for intuitive purposes only, we will ignore it in completing the derivation of a closed form expression. (12) and (13) imply
Recall that S n−k (||U ′ n−k xĵ||) denotes the hyper-sphere in ℜ n−k with radius ||U ′ n−k xĵ|| and centered at the origin and S n−k (U ′ n−k xĵ, ||xĵ||ǫ) denotes the points contained by S n−k (||U ′ n−k xĵ||) whose distance from U ′ n−k xĵ is no greater than ||xĵ||ǫ. Using basic principles from measure theory, it can be shown that
We have arrived at Equation (5) from Section IV-D. Next, we derive the desired closed-form expression (6) . To simplify exposition, we prove the following result for m ≥ 0, z ∈ ℜ m , and c ≥ 0 (by plugging in m = n − k, z = U ′ n−k xĵ, and c = ||xĵ||ǫ, (6) follows). 
23 S1(||U ′ 1 xĵ||) consists of two points. Recall that we define
as 0.5 if S1(U ′ 1 xĵ, ||xĵ||ǫ) is one point, and as 1 otherwise. Moreover, we define
as 1. THE HYPER-SPHERE Sm(||z||) AND ONE "SOUTH POLE"
Before proving (14) we establish:
Indeed, with V ol(.) denoting volume, it can be shown that
. The last equality follows from [36] . Now we return to proving (14) . 
The set of points on S m (||z||) whose distance from z equals c is the intersection of S m (||z||) with the hyper-plane whose perpendicular to z is of length h as seen in Figure 12 . Thus, S m (z, c) are all those points on S m (||z||) not below that hyper-plane.
Sub-case m = 2: Since S 2 (||z||) is an ordinary circle, then the angle θ in Figure 12 determines the surface area ratio as follows with the hyper-plane whose perpendicular to z is of length 0 ≤ h 1 ≤ h as seen in Figure 12 .
The surface area of this intersection equals the surface area of S m−1 (r(h 1 )). Thus, (15) (r(h 1 )) m−2 dh 1 .
To evaluate the integral, we change coordinates with h 1 = ||z||(1−cos(θ 1 )). So, h 1 = 0, h implies that θ 1 = 0, arccos(1 − h/||z||). And, r(||z||(1 − cos(θ 1 )) = ||z||sin(θ 1 ) = dh 1 dθ 1
. Therefore, 
Case ||z|| √ 2 < c < ||z||2: As depicted in Figure 13 , S m (z, c) contains the entire northern hemisphere of S m (||z||). Let S n (−z, c) denote the "south pole" cap defined by h ′ (and c ′ ) in .
By replacing "c" with "c ′ " in (16) and (17) 
From Figure 13 , it can be seen that θ is the top angle on an isocelese triangle with sides of length ||z|| and base of length c ′ . So, sin(θ/2) = 
To compute GR(m) for m ≥ 1, we use the following facts: Γ(z + 1) = zΓ(z) for z > 0, Γ(1/2) = √ π, and Γ(1) = 1. Thus, we get a recursive procedure for computing GR(m). 
E. Known Input Attack on General Distance-Preserving Data Perturbation
Previously, we had considered the case where the data perturbation is assumed to be orthogonal (does not involve a fixed translation, v T = 0). Now we briefly discuss how the attack technique and its analysis can be extended to arbitrary Euclidean distance preserving perturbation (v T = 0).
Extending the algorithms for inferring π a : Since the length of the private data tuples may not be preserved, then the definition of validity in Section IV-A must be changed: α on I is valid if ∀i, j ∈ I, ||x i − x j || = ||y α(i) − y α(j) ||. As well, the definition of C(α 1 ,î) (given I 1 ⊆ I, α 1 a valid assignment on I 1 , andî ∈ (I \ I 1 )), must change: the set of all j ∈ ({1, . . . , m} \ α 1 (I 1 ))
such that for all i 1 ∈ I 1 , ||x i 1 − xˆi|| = ||y α 1 (i 1 ) − y j ||. With these changes, Algorithms IV-A.1, IV-A.2, and IV-A.3 work correctly as stated.
Extending the known input attack:
The basic idea is simple and relies upon the fact that the same v T is added to all tuples in the perturbation of X q . Fix one tuple, say x 1 and y 1 , and consider the following differences x − q−1 , hence, the attack and its analysis from the orthogonal data perturbation case can be applied. The details are straightforward and are omitted for brevity. However, a caveat is in order. The attack depends upon the choice of the tuple to fix. Therefore, the attacker examines them all and chooses the highest privacy breach probability.
